Systems and methods for authentication

ABSTRACT

An embodiment method includes receiving, by an access point (AP), a first authentication request from a station (STA) that requests authentication of the STA, transmitting, by the AP, a second authentication request to a server that requests including extensible authentication protocol (EAP) authentication signaling to verify mutual possession of a shared key between the STA and the server, and receiving, by the AP, a first authentication response from the server in response to the second authentication request. The first authentication response includes an indication that authentication of the STA was successful. The method further includes transmitting, by the AP, a second authentication response to the STA, and receiving, by the AP, an association request that includes a message integrity code (MIC) from the STA.

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/492,911 filed on Apr. 20, 2017 and entitled “Systems and Methods forAuthentication,” which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser.No. 14/728,560 filed on Jun. 2, 2015, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,674,702 issuedon Jun. 6, 2017, and entitled “Systems and Methods for Authentication,”which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/734,471filed on Jan. 4, 2013, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,077,701 issued on Jul. 7,2015 and entitled “Systems and Methods for Authentication,” whichclaimed the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/583,856,filed on Jan. 6, 2012, entitled “System and Methods for IEEE 802.11 TGAiFILS Authentication Protocol,” all of which applications are herebyincorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates to systems and methods for wirelesscommunications, and, in particular, to systems and methods forauthentication.

BACKGROUND

IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards for implementing a wireless local areanetwork such as a wireless local area network (WLAN). IEEE 802.11 is afamily of protocols that includes a series of half-duplex over the airmodulation techniques that use the same basic protocol. The protocoldefines the media access control (MAC) layer and the physical (PHY)layer.

IEEE 802.11 incorporates IEEE 802.1x, which defines the encapsulation ofthe extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local area network(LAN) (EAPOL). Authentication using 802.1x involves a supplicant, forexample a station, an authenticator, for example an access point, and anauthentication server.

IEEE 802.11i provides a robust security network association (RSNA)involving a 4-way handshake and a group key handshake, which utilizeauthentication services and port access controls to establish and changethe appropriate cryptographic key.

SUMMARY

An embodiment method includes receiving, by an access point (AP), afirst authentication request from a station (STA) that requestsauthentication of the STA, transmitting, by the AP, a secondauthentication request to a server that requests including extensibleauthentication protocol (EAP) authentication signaling to verify mutualpossession of a shared key between the STA and the server, andreceiving, by the AP, a first authentication response from the server inresponse to the second authentication request. The first authenticationresponse includes an indication that authentication of the STA wassuccessful. The method further includes transmitting, by the AP, asecond authentication response to the STA, and receiving, by the AP, anassociation request that includes a message integrity code (MIC) fromthe STA. In one example, the indication that authentication of the STAwas successful is included in the second authentication response. In thesame example, or another example, the method further includes receivingan EAP request identity transmission from the STA, and receiving an EAPresponse message from the STA. In any of the preceding examples, or inanother example, the association request further includes an EAP overlocal area network (LAN) (EAPOL) key. In any of the preceding examples,or in another example, the second authentication request is a fastinitial link setup (FILS) authentication request. In any of thepreceding examples, or in another example, the method further includestransmitting an associating response to the STA in response to receivingthe associating request. An apparatus and computer program product forperforming this method are also provided.

An embodiment method includes transmitting, by a station to an accesspoint (AP), a fast initial link setup (FILS) authentication request andtransmitting, by the station to the AP, an authorization request, wherethe authorization request includes an extensible authentication protocol(EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) key. The method alsoincludes receiving, by the station from the AP, an association response,where the association response includes the EAPOL key.

An embodiment method includes receiving, by an access point (AP) from astation, a fast initial link setup (FILS) authentication request andreceiving, by the AP from the station, an authorization request, wherethe authorization request includes an extensible authentication protocol(EAP) over local area network (LAN) (EAPOL) key. The method alsoincludes transmitting, by the AP to the station, an associationresponse, where the association response includes the EAPOL key.

An embodiment method includes generating a pairwise master key (PMK) andtransmitting, by an authorization server to an access point (AP), thePMK. The method also includes receiving, by the authorization serverfrom the AP, an authorization response, where the authorization responseincludes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local areanetwork (LAN) (EAPOL) key.

An embodiment authorization server includes a processor and anon-transitory computer readable storage medium storing programming forexecution by the processor. The programming includes instructions togenerate a pairwise master key (PMK) and transmit, to an access point(AP), the PMK. The programming also includes instructions to receive,from the AP, an authorization response, where the authorization responseincludes an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) over local areanetwork (LAN) (EAPOL) key.

The foregoing has outlined rather broadly the features of an embodimentof the present invention in order that the detailed description of theinvention that follows may be better understood. Additional features andadvantages of embodiments of the invention will be describedhereinafter, which form the subject of the claims of the invention. Itshould be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the conceptionand specific embodiments disclosed may be readily utilized as a basisfor modifying or designing other structures or processes for carryingout the same purposes of the present invention. It should also berealized by those skilled in the art that such equivalent constructionsdo not depart from the spirit and scope of the invention as set forth inthe appended claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the present invention, and theadvantages thereof, reference is now made to the following descriptionstaken in conjunction with the accompanying drawing, in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a system for RSNA authentication;

FIG. 2 illustrates a state machine for RSNA authentication;

FIGS. 3a-b illustrate a flowchart of a method of authenticating withRSNA;

FIG. 4 illustrates an embodiment system for authentication;

FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment state machine for authentication;

FIG. 6 illustrates a flowchart of an embodiment method ofauthentication; and

FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram illustrating a computing platformthat may be used for implementing, for example, the devices and methodsdescribed herein, in accordance with an embodiment.

Corresponding numerals and symbols in the different figures generallyrefer to corresponding parts unless otherwise indicated. The figures aredrawn to clearly illustrate the relevant aspects of the embodiments andare not necessarily drawn to scale.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS

It should be understood at the outset that although an illustrativeimplementation of one or more embodiments are provided below, thedisclosed systems and/or methods may be implemented using any number oftechniques, whether currently known or in existence. The disclosureshould in no way be limited to the illustrative implementations,drawings, and techniques illustrated below, including the exemplarydesigns and implementations illustrated and described herein, but may bemodified within the scope of the appended claims along with their fullscope of equivalents.

Fast initial link setup (FILS) is intended to reduce the time it takesfor a station to connect with an access point (AP) with a MAC layerprotocol for fast authentication and association of a station with anaccess point. FIG. 1 illustrates a system for performing RSNA. Thesystem includes station (STA) 102, access point (AP) 106, andauthorization server (AS) 104. Station 102 performs both the policydecision and policy enforcement. Authorization server 104 performspolicy decision, while access point 106 performs policy enforcement.

A state machine for RSNA authentication is illustrated in FIG. 2. Thestate machine contains state 264, state 266, state 267, and state 268.In state 264, the system is unauthenticated and unassociated. Also, whenthere is successful 802.11 authentication, the state machine transitionsfrom state 264 to state 266. Then, when the state machine is in state266, and there is successful association/re-association and RSNA isrequired, the state machine transitions to state 267. However, when thestate machine is in state 266, and there is successfulassociation/re-association and RSNA is not required, or there is a fastbasic service set (BSS) transition, the state machine transitions tostate 268. When the system is de-associated, there is successful 802.11authentication, or there is unsuccessful association/re-association, andthe state machine is in state 267, the state machine transitions tostate 266. Additionally, when the state machine is in state 267, andthere is a successful 4-way handshake, the state machine transitions tostate 268. Also, when the state machine is in state 268, and there isde-association, unsuccessful association/re-association, or successful802.11 authentication, the state machine transitions to state 266. Whenthe state machine is in state 266, state 267, or state 268, and thesystem is deauthenticated, the state machine transitions to state 264.

FIGS. 3a-b illustrate a method of performing RSNA authentication. Themethod includes six stages. Stages 1, 2, and 3 are illustrated in FIG.3a , while stages 4, 5, and 6 are illustrated in FIG. 3b . As the methodprogresses through stage 1, stage 2, stage 3, stage 4, and stage 5, thestate machine progresses through state 264, state 266, state 267, andstate 268. Initially, the station and the access point areunauthenticated, unassociated and 802.1x is blocked. Stage 1 includesnetwork and security capability discovery 120. The access pointtransmits an initiation frame to the station in step 136. In oneembodiment, in step 136, the access point transmits a beacon frame. Inanother embodiment, the access point transmits a probe response in step136 in response to a probe request transmitted by the station to theaccess point in step 134.

Then, in stage 2, 802.11 authentication and association 122 isperformed. In step 138, the station transmits an 802.11 authenticationrequest to the access point. Then, in step 140, the access pointtransmits an 802.11 authentication response to the station. Next, instep 142, the station transmits an association request to the accesspoint. After that, in step 144, the access point transmits an 802.11association response to the station.

Associated 802.1x blocked security parameters are authenticated in thestation in step 146, and in the access point in step 148.

Next, in stage 3, EAP/802.1x/Radius authentication 124 is performed. Amutual authentication protocol is performed based on EAP authentication.The access point serves as an authenticator to relay EAP messages. Instep 150, the station optionally transmits EAPOL Start. Then, in step152, the access point transmits EAPOL Request Identity to the station,and in step 154, the station transmits the EAPOL Response identity tothe access point. After that, the access point transmits an access pointradius request to the authentication server in step 156. Theauthentication server and the station perform mutual authentication instep 158. Next, the authentication server transmits a radius acceptsignal to the access point in step 160, and the access point transmitsan EPOL success signal to the station in step 162.

The master session key (MSK) is generated in the station in step 164.The MSK is also generated in the authentication server in step 168.Additionally, the pairwise master key (PMK) is generated in the stationin step 166. Also, the PMK is generated in the authentication server instep 170, and the PMK is transmitted from the authentication server tothe access point in step 172.

After that, in stage 4, four-way handshake 126 is performed. Both thestation and the access point can trust each other with the authorizedPMK. In step 174, an A-Nonce value is transmitted by the access point tothe station. The station then constructs a pairwise transient key (PTK)in step 176. Next, in step 178, the station transmits an S-Nonce valueto the access point with a message integrity code (MIC) includingauthentication. After that, in step 180, the access point constructs thePTK and the group temporal key (GTK). The access point, in step 182,transmits the GTK, the A-Nonce value, a sequence number that will beused in the next multicast or broadcast frame, and another MIC. In step184, the station transmits an acknowledgement to the access point.

Next, in step 190, the GTK is generated and the 802.1x server isunblocked in the station. Also, 802.1x is unblocked in the access pointin step 192. A random GTK is generated in the access point in step 194.Then, in optional stage 5, group key handshake 128 is performed. In step196, the access point transmits an EAPOL key containing the GTK, a keyID, and a MIC to the station. The station responds, in step 198, bytransmitting an acknowledgement of the new GTK to the access point.

Finally, in Stage 6, secure data communication 130 is performed. In step202, protected data packets are transmitted between the station and theaccess point. Also, in step 204, dynamic host configuration protocol(DHC) requests and responses between the station and a DHCP server areperformed.

An embodiment system for authentication is illustrated in FIG. 4. Thesystem includes station 102, which communicates with access point 106and authentication server 104. Additionally, access point 106communicates with authentication server 104. In this system, the FILSauthentication will take place by bypassing state 2 and state 3. Duringa specialized state, the FILS authentication exchange will take acondensed version of message exchange compared to the method illustratedby FIGS. 3a-3b . An embodiment state machine for authentication isillustrated in FIG. 5. The state machine contains three states: state264, state 268, and state 269. In state 264, the system isunauthenticated and unassociated, and there are class 1 frames. When thestate machine is in state 264, and there is successful fast initial linksetup (FILS) authentication, the state machine transitions to state 269.When the state machine is in state 269, the system is FILSauthenticated, and the IEEE 802.1x controlled port is blocked. Also,there are class 1 and 2 frames with selected management and data frames.Then, if the system is in state 269, and there is a FILS key handshake,the system transition to state 268. When the state machine is in state268 the system is authenticated and associated, and an IEEE 802.1xcontrolled port is unblocked. Additionally, in state 268, there areclass 1, 2, and 3 frames. However, if the state machine is in state 269,and there is FILS deauthorization, the state machine transitions tostate 264. Similarly, if the state machine is in state 268, and thesystem is deauthenticated, the state machine transitions to state 264.

A flowchart of an embodiment method for authentication involving astation, an access point, and an authentication server is illustrated inFIG. 6. The method includes state 264, state 269, and state 268. In thisembodiment, FILS specific messages are used to facilitate the FILSauthentication. Also, in this embodiment, stage 2 and stage 3, discussedabove with respect to FIGS. 3a-3b , are bypassed. State 264 correspondsto stage 1, state 269 corresponds to stage 4, and state 268 correspondsto stage 5 and stage 6.

State 264 includes step 228 and step 230. Also, state 269 includes steps232-252. State 268 includes step 254, step 256, step 258, and step 260.Initially, in state 264, the station and access point areunauthenticated, unassociated, and 802.1x is blocked. While in state264, the access point transmits an initiation frame to the station instep 230. In one embodiment, in step 230, the access point transmits abeacon frame. In another embodiment, the access point transmits a proberesponse in step 230 in response to a probe request transmitted by thestation to the access point in step 228. Then the system transitions tostate 269 if FILS authentication is successful.

Once in state 269, the station transmits an authorization request to theaccess point in step 232. For example, the authorization request mightinclude EAPOL start with security parameters for a FILS handshake. Inone example, an EAP request identity transmission is sent from thestation to the access point, and the access point responds with an EAPresponse message. Next, the access point transmits an access request tothe authentication server in step 234. The access request may be an EAPrequest. Then, in step 236, the station and the authentication serverperform an EAP authentication protocol exchange. After that, theauthorization server generates a PMK in step 238. Next, in step 240, theauthorization server transmits an acceptance, an EAP success, and thePMK to the access point. The access point then stores the PMK andgenerates an A-Nonce value in step 242. Then, in step 244, the accesspoint transmits an 802.11 authorization response to the server. The802.11 authorization response may include an EAPOL key, which mayinclude the A-Nonce value and a unicast MIC. Next, the station generatesa PMK in step 246 and derives the PTK in step 248. After that, in step250, the station transmits an 802.11 association request to the accesspoint, which may be an EAPOL key, which may include an S-Nonce value anda unicast MIC. The access point then transmits an 802.11 associationresponse to the station in step 252. The 802.11 association response mayinclude an EAPOL key that may include a PTK, a unicast MIC, and anencrypted GTK or an integrity group temporal key (IGTK).

Finally, in state 268, the station optionally transmits an EAPOL key instep 254, which may contain a unicast MIC, to the access point. Finallythe server installs the PTK, the GTK and/or the IGTK in step 256, andthe access point installs the PTK, the GTK and/or the IGTK in step 258.Finally, in step 260, secure data communications between the station andthe access point proceed.

FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of processing system 270 that may beused for implementing the devices and methods disclosed herein. Specificdevices may utilize all of the components shown, or only a subset of thecomponents, and levels of integration may vary from device to device.Furthermore, a device may contain multiple instances of a component,such as multiple processing units, processors, memories, transmitters,receivers, etc. The processing system may comprise a processing unitequipped with one or more input devices, such as a microphone, mouse,touchscreen, keypad, keyboard, and the like. Also, processing system 270may be equipped with one or more output devices, such as a speaker, aprinter, a display, and the like. The processing unit may includecentral processing unit (CPU) 274, memory 276, mass storage device 278,video adapter 280, and I/O interface 288 connected to a bus.

The bus may be one or more of any type of several bus architecturesincluding a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, videobus, or the like. CPU 274 may comprise any type of electronic dataprocessor. Memory 276 may comprise any type of system memory such asstatic random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM),synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), a combination thereof,or the like. In an embodiment, the memory may include ROM for use atboot-up, and DRAM for program and data storage for use while executingprograms.

Mass storage device 278 may comprise any type of storage deviceconfigured to store data, programs, and other information and to makethe data, programs, and other information accessible via the bus. Massstorage device 278 may comprise, for example, one or more of a solidstate drive, hard disk drive, a magnetic disk drive, an optical diskdrive, or the like.

Video adaptor 280 and I/O interface 288 provide interfaces to coupleexternal input and output devices to the processing unit. Asillustrated, examples of input and output devices include the displaycoupled to the video adapter and the mouse/keyboard/printer coupled tothe I/O interface. Other devices may be coupled to the processing unit,and additional or fewer interface cards may be utilized. For example, aserial interface card (not pictured) may be used to provide a serialinterface for a printer.

The processing unit also includes one or more network interface 284,which may comprise wired links, such as an Ethernet cable or the like,and/or wireless links to access nodes or different networks. Networkinterface 284 allows the processing unit to communicate with remoteunits via the networks. For example, the network interface may providewireless communication via one or more transmitters/transmit antennasand one or more receivers/receive antennas. In an embodiment, theprocessing unit is coupled to a local-area network or a wide-areanetwork for data processing and communications with remote devices, suchas other processing units, the Internet, remote storage facilities, orthe like.

Advantages of an embodiment include compatibility with the RSNA securityprotocol and security. Another advantage of an embodiment is the use ofonly nine or ten messages in a handshake. In an example, a four wayhandshake is reduced to a three way handshake.

While several embodiments have been provided in the present disclosure,it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods might beembodied in many other specific forms without departing from the spiritor scope of the present disclosure. The present examples are to beconsidered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the intention is notto be limited to the details given herein. For example, the variouselements or components may be combined or integrated in another systemor certain features may be omitted, or not implemented.

In addition, techniques, systems, subsystems, and methods described andillustrated in the various embodiments as discrete or separate may becombined or integrated with other systems, modules, techniques, ormethods without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.Other items shown or discussed as coupled or directly coupled orcommunicating with each other may be indirectly coupled or communicatingthrough some interface, device, or intermediate component whetherelectrically, mechanically, or otherwise. Other examples of changes,substitutions, and alterations are ascertainable by one skilled in theart and could be made without departing from the spirit and scopedisclosed herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for authenticating access to anInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 network,the method comprising: receiving, by an access point (AP) in the 802.11network, an authentication request from a station (STA), theauthentication request requesting authentication of the STA;transmitting, by the AP, a fast initial link setup (FILS) authenticationrequest to a server, the FILS authentication request includingextensible authentication protocol (EAP) authentication signaling toverify mutual possession of a shared key between the STA and the server;receiving, by the AP, a FILS authentication response from the server inresponse to the FILS authentication request, the FILS authenticationresponse including an indication that authentication of the STA wassuccessful; transmitting, by the AP, an authentication response to theSTA; receiving, by the AP, an IEEE 802.11 association request from theSTA, the IEEE 802.11 association request requesting that the STA beassociated or re-associated with the IEEE 802.11 network; andtransmitting, by the AP, an IEEE 802.11 association response to the STAthat includes a message integrity code (MIC) and an A-Nonce value inresponse to receiving the IEEE 802.11 association request.
 2. The methodof claim 1, wherein the indication that authentication of the STA wassuccessful is included in the authentication response.
 3. The method ofclaim 1, further comprising: receiving, by the AP, an EAP requestidentity transmission from the STA; and receiving, by the AP, an EAPresponse message from the STA.
 4. An access point (AP) adapted toprovide authenticated access to an Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 network, the AP comprising: aprocessor; and a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storingprogramming for execution by the processor, the programming includinginstructions to: receive an authentication request from a station (STA),the authentication request requesting authentication of the STA;transmit a fast initial link setup (FILS) authentication request to aserver, the FILS authentication request including extensibleauthentication protocol (EAP) authentication signaling to verify mutualpossession of a shared key between the STA and the server; receive aFILS authentication response from the server in response to theFILS-authentication request, the FILS authentication response includingan indication that authentication of the STA was successful; transmit anauthentication response to the STA; receive an IEEE 802.11 associationrequest from the STA, the IEEE 802.11 association request requestingthat the STA be associated or re-associated with the IEEE 802.11network; and transmit an IEEE 802.11 association response to the STAthat includes a message integrity code (MIC) and an A-Nonce value inresponse to receiving the IEEE 802.11 association request.
 5. The AP ofclaim 4, wherein the authentication response carries the indication thatauthentication of the STA was successful as was originally included inthe FILS authentication response received from the server.
 6. The AP ofclaim 4, wherein the programming further includes instructions to:receive an EAP request identity transmission from the STA; and receivean EAP response message from the STA.
 7. A method for authenticatingaccess to an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)802.11 network, the method comprising: receiving, by an access point(AP) in the 802.11 network, an authentication request from a station(STA), the authentication request requesting authentication of the STA;transmitting, by the AP, a fast initial link setup (FILS) authenticationrequest to a server, the FILS authentication request includingextensible authentication protocol (EAP) authentication signaling toverify mutual possession of a shared key between the STA and the server;receiving, by the AP, a FILS authentication response from the server inresponse to the FILS authentication request, the FILS authenticationresponse indicating that authentication of the STA was successful;transmitting, by the AP, an authentication response to the STA;receiving, by the AP, an association request from the STA, theassociation request requesting that the STA be associated orre-associated with the IEEE 802.11 network; and transmitting, by the AP,an association response to the STA in response to receiving theassociation request, the association response carrying the indicationthat authentication of the STA was successful.
 8. The method of claim 7,wherein the association response includes a message integrity code (MIC)and an A-Nonce value.
 9. The method of claim 7, wherein the methodfurther comprises: receiving, by the AP, an EAP request identitytransmission from the STA; and receiving, by the AP, an EAP responsemessage from the STA.